

serious consideration. I urge my colleagues to review them personally in these coming days as they formulate their own views on how we ought to proceed with regard to U.S.-Cuban relations.

Mr. KENNEDY. Would the Senator yield?

Mr. DODD. I will be happy to.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I just want to, first of all, commend my friend, the Senator from Connecticut, for his understanding of Cardinal Law's statement and for the constructive nature in which the Senator has referred to it.

I do think that it is an enormously serious document. I agree with the Senator that it deserves a great deal of study. I had had the opportunity to talk to him prior to the time of delivery. He is motivated by a very deep and continuing humanitarian concern from his frequent visits there and from the study of the people on the island.

I just want to commend the Senator, who is a real leader in the issues of the hemisphere, and to thank him for an excellent statement, and to say that I think it has been an enormously constructive and positive statement and I hope our colleagues will pay attention to it. I thank the Senator.

Mr. DODD. I thank my colleague from Massachusetts.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. ASHCROFT addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri.

Mr. ASHCROFT. Thank you, Mr. President.

#### PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON ACCESSION OF POLAND, HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

The Senate continued with the consideration of the treaty.

Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, I rise to participate in the debate regarding NATO.

One of the interesting facts about the debate is that the mission of NATO has not been a matter of significant discussion.

There are a lot of questions—about the cost of enlargement, the political and strategic benefits to potential new members of NATO, and the effect of any expansion of the NATO alliance on our relationship with Russia—that have all been discussed. These issues have received the most attention.

But while expansion of NATO numerically is significant, perhaps the mission of NATO deserves serious consideration as we look at an institution which has not only been involved in a long heritage of successful maintenance of the territorial integrity of our comembers of this organization in Europe, but has also been a vital part of protecting American interests.

NATO has been very successful. Earlier, the Senator from Washington stated that NATO has been the most successful multinational defense orga-

nization in the history of the world. And I think that is a fair statement. A major achievement of the organization is the fact that a third world war has not erupted in Europe. It is pretty clear that the Soviet Union, in its days of power and strength, dared not infringe on the territory of those protected by the NATO alliance. That is to the credit of the organization.

Article 5 of the NATO treaty was the heart of the organization. And I would like to refer the Members of the Senate and those interested in this debate to Article 5 at this time.

#### Article 5 States:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

What the heart of the treaty really designates is that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was an organization designed to affect and protect the territory—the territorial integrity—of the Nations that were its member states.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, we did not have the same kind of threat to the territory of the NATO states that had existed prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union. I think few of us would argue with the proposition that the NATO alliance really was an alliance which drew a bright line to defend against the potential incursion by the Soviet Union.

Since the Soviet Union collapsed, there has been discussion among NATO planners to find a new mission for the Alliance. Counterproliferation, the advancing of political "interests" of NATO members, peacekeeping, and crisis management became the kinds of issues discussed at NATO—an entirely different mission than it originally had and, frankly, a mission that is not consistent with the charter of NATO itself.

The assembled NATO powers, in 1991, adopted and promulgated a strategic concept. For the strategic concept of 1991, there was an interesting transition in the statement of what NATO is all about. Collective defense, the concept in Article 5 which has been the central theme and thesis of NATO for its years of great success, was relegated to the bottom of the list of mission priorities.

As a result of putting collective defense at the bottom, a number of other things were listed as missions of NATO. In some respects, I find these new mission priorities to be challenging because they are not the kinds of things for which NATO was created, and they are not the kinds of missions that the U.S. Senate and its giants in the Senate ratified when ratifying the

NATO treaty 50 years ago. The "fundamental security task" in the new strategic concept of 1991 was "To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe . . . in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force."

This is a major expansion and a substantial change in the mission of NATO. It is a change in the direction in which the organization is headed. It changes NATO's responsibility. Clearly, no longer is NATO for the collective defense of a limited territory. NATO now has the impossible task of stopping intimidation and coercion throughout NATO and non-NATO Europe alike. So the mission of NATO has been transitioning from the mission ratified by the Senate, and it has been evolving, as if treaties are allowed to evolve. It has been organic, rather than static or having specific boundaries.

The catch phrase that defines this effort is that NATO must "go out of area or go out of business." This whole concept, I think, demands very close observation.

Mr. President, I have tried to point out that the objectives specified in the strategic concept of 1991 embraced by the NATO allies is a set of objectives far different from that which the NATO organization was authorized to achieve in its Charter, which was ratified by the U.S. Senate. I believe that NATO was not intended for these new purposes.

The understanding of the U.S. Senate in 1949, and the understanding of the American people, has been that NATO is designed to protect territory—the territory of member nations—not designed to be on call in other areas in Europe and, as the Secretary of State has mentioned, in Africa and literally to the uttermost parts of the Earth.

I will be submitting an amendment for consideration by the Senate to make it clear that collective security will remain the heart of NATO, and that this is the only mission allowable under the treaty, because it is impossible to amend the treaty without bringing it back to this Senate for amendment.

My amendment is tailored not to constrain NATO's effectiveness in the future, nor is it intended to micro-manage NATO's military planning from the Senate floor. The central portion of the amendment is taken directly from the North Atlantic Treaty itself. My amendment states that any military operation outside Article V must be based on the principle of collective defense, namely, the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of a NATO member.

I thank the Senator from Georgia for his agreement in allowing me to finish my remarks.